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USE OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING IN A 23 (b) (3) CLASS ACTION
Alameda Oil v. Ideal Basic Industries, Inc.,
326 F. Supp. 98 (D. Colo. 1971)
Plaintiff stockholders sought to determine whether their litigation
could continue as a class action under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) 1 against
a corporation and its directors. The action was based on alleged viola-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act2 and breach of state common law
fiduciary duty. The district court allowed the class action to tenta-
tively proceed, but ruled that a preliminary hearing should be held before
issuing notice on the threshold issues of fact to determine if a cause of
action existed.3
Due process guarantees that a person will not be deprived of his
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3):
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only in-
dividual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of sep-
arate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be en-
countered in the management of a class action.
The prerequisites of 23(a) are: 1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all
members is impractible; 2) legal and factual questions must be common to the class;
3) the claims or defenses of the representatives must be typical of those of the class;
4) the representative parties must adequately protect the interests of the class. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(a). For a history of the class action in the federal courts prior to the
present rule see Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amend-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 375-86
(1967).
2. Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1970);
ch. 404, § 14(c), 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (1970).
3. Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus. Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98, 105 (D. Colo.
1971). The court noted, however, that if facts should develop which would warrant
a change in the pre-trial procedure, it would entertain variations suggested in
its approach. The case proceeded to trial and resulted in a directed verdict for de-
fendant. Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus. Inc., 337 F. Supp. 194 (D. Colo.
1972). There was no mention of the earlier suggestion of a preliminary hearing or
the fact that the case was originally brought as a class action.
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property without an opportunity to protect his rights in that property.4
In class actions this requires that the interests of absent parties be ade-
quately protected.5 Although notice may not be essential in all
class actions," Rule 23, designed to satisfy the requirements of due
process,7 provides that members of a 23(b)(3) class action receive
the best practible notice under the circumstances." The notice provi-
sions of Rule 23 have given rise to several problems:9 what is adequate
4. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1950).
Since a chose in action is property, this guaranty protects the right of plaintiffs to
present their claims in court. See Chemical Foundation, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Ne-
mours & Co., 29 F.2d 597, 602 (D. Del. 1928), aff'd sub nom. Farbwerke vormals
Meister Lucious & Bruning v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 39 F.2d 366 (3d Cir. 1930),
a!f'd, 283 U.S. 152 (1931); Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, 17 F. Supp. 576
(N.D. Ill. 1936).
5. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); see Comment, Manageability of
Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70 MicH. L. REv. 338
(1971).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Rule 23 does not require notice in actions properly
brought under sections (b)(1)&(2). The notice provisions of Rule 23 were designed
to comport with due process. See note 7 infra and accompanying text. See also
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan. 1968) (the es-
sence of due process is adequate representation); Maraist and Sharp, Federal Proce-
dure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process and the Class Action, 49 TExAs L. REv. 1
(1970); Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 629,
640 (1965). For a view that due process requires some type of notice in all actions
see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g 41 F.R.D. 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), decided, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); accord, Pasquier v. Tarr,
318 F. Supp. 1350, 1353-54 (E.D. La. 1970).
7. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Advisory
Committee's Note, Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.
69, 106-07 (1966); Note, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J.
1204, 1217 n.57 (1966).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2):
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identi-
fied through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that
(A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a spec-
ified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
§ 23(c)(2), although directing the court as to how the judgment should read, does not
attempt to predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment. See Frankel, Some
Preliminary Notions Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 47 (1967); Kaplan,
supra note 1, at 393; Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 7, at 106-07. See also
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 86 Comment 1, at 116 (1942).
9. For a general discussion of these problems see Note, Class Actions Under
Federal Rule 23 (bX3)--The Notice Requirement, 29 MD. L. Rnv. 139 (1969).
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notice;' 0 who is to bear the cost of issuing notice; 1 and when notice
should issue.' 2 The Alameda court faced the narrow issue of when to
notify potential class members of a class action of questionable merit.' 8
110. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1958), rev'g 41
F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), decided, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); City of Phil-
adelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971); Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1966); Note, supra note 9,
at 141-50 ("individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort" is not required by due process); Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice
and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities
Laws, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 889 (1968); Note, Notice in Class Actions-Mullane Re-
considered, 43 TI. L. Rav. 369, 375 (1969) (Rule 23 should be amended to delete
the phrase "including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort").
11. See Green v. Wolfe Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 n.15 (2d Cir. 1968); Dolgow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), remanded for further consideration, 438
F.2d 825 (2d Cir.), decided, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (defendant might be
required to bear the cost of notice); Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (initially plaintiff must shoulder the burden); School Dist. v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (the court may have to bear the
burden). See also Booth v. General Dynamics, 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill. 1967)
(expense involved in individual notice should not inhibit an otherwise proper class ac-
tion). But see Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1250 (N.D. Ga. 1971)
(court knew of no authority under which it could assume cost of providing notice).
12. See note 13 infra. See also Frankel, supra note 8.
13. In attempting to deal with this problem courts have devised various approaches:
1) allow class status but postpone notice pending a preliminary hearing of the merits
to determine who should bear the cost of notice, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52
F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 2) conditionally allow class status but delay notice
through discovery, Herbst v. Able, 278 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Fischer v. Kletz, 41
F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 3) delay determination of the propriety of a class action
pending a preliminary hearing to determine the possibility of plaintiff's success at trial,
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), remanded for further consid-
eration, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.), decided 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); cf. Suro-
witz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda
Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1968). But see Miller v. Mackey
Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971) (preliminary hearing on the merits before
determining propriety of the class action held improper).
Delaying notice through discovery may limit use of the class action by placing the
costly expense of discovery on the class representative. Note, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-Evidentiary Hearing on Merits Required in Class Action Under Rule
23(b)(3), 5 GA. ST. B.J. 278, 285 (1968). See also 40 U. COLo. L. Rav. 462, 466
(1968). A preliminary hearing to determine who should bear the cost of notice has
been criticized as an indirect method achieving the same result as a preliminary hear-
ing on the merits to determine the propriety of a class action. Dolgow v. Anderson,
53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The approach adopted by the court in Alameda
seems for all practical purposes identical to the method used in Dolgow.
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Rule 23 neither explicitly authorizes nor forbids a preliminary hear-
ing before issuing notice, 14 and although questioned,"5 preliminary hear-
ings have been approved by other courts and commentators.' 6 There
are several advantages to such an approach. If the claim is insub-
stantial, the action will not be pursued as a class suit, resulting in a
considerable saving of time and expense since no notice is issued to the
class.' 7  A preliminary hearing may also be used to avoid nuisance
suits "' and to eliminate the adverse effect on the price of a corporate
defendant's stock which may result from widespread notice and pub-
licity.' Further, early issuance of notice may imply that a potentially
unmeritorious claim is well founded and thereby produce unnecessary
controversy. 20 Finally, a preliminary hearing prevents attorneys from
using notice simply to solicit clients.21
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
15. See Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971); City of
Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Berland v. Mack, 48
F.R.D. 121, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (rejected use of preliminary hearing to determine
who should pay for notice); Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D.
465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
16. See Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), remanded for further considera-
tion, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.), decided, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); 40 U. COLO.
L. REV. 462 (1968); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Evidentiary Hearings
on Merits Required in Class Actions Under Rule 23 (bX3),.5 GA. ST. B.J. 278 (1968).
17. See Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98 (D. Colo.
1971); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), remanded for further
consideration, 478 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.), decided, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971);
40 U. CoLo. L. REv. 462, 465 n.23 (1968).
18. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), remanded
for further consideration, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.), decided, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); 40 U. CoLo. L. REv. 462 (1968).
19. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), remanded for fur-
ther consideration, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.), decided, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
See also Green, Civil Liability to Stockholders Under the Securities Act of 1933 and
Remedy by Class Action, 2 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 34, 48 (1965); Note, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure-Evidentiary Hearings on Merits Required in Class Actions Under
Rule 23 (bX3), 5 GA. ST. B. J. 278 (1968); 40 U. CoLo. L. Rnv. 462 (1968).
20. See Berley v. Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 40 U.
CoLo. L. Rnv. 462, 466 n.23 (1968). See also Comment, Recovery of Damages in
Class Actions, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 768, 777 (1965).
21. See 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 462, 465 (1968). This may be the most substan-
tial justification for a preliminary hearing. Other courts have expressed concern over
the problem of client solicitation. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147,
152 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), decided, 52 F.R.D. 253
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 111
(S.D.N.Y. 1956). For a discussion of notice and solicitation problems in class ac-
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Courts rejecting use of a preliminary hearing contend that it is not
authorized by Rule 23,22 that it leads to multiple adjudication of the
merits,2I and may deprive the plaintiffs of the right to a jury trial.24
Further, it is argued that the thrust of Rule 23 (b) (3) is that notice
should issue as soon as possible after the commencement of the action .2
An additional objection to the use of a preliminary hearing is that it
may permit "one-way intervention," which Rule 23 was designed to
prohibit.26  The rule was drafted to prevent class members from inter-
vening after a final determination on the merits and benefiting from a
decision in their favor, though remaining unaffected by an adverse
decision. 7  The preliminary hearing, however, is not a final determina-
tion of liability. If the plaintiff is successful, notice will be sent to the
class, and those who fail to opt out will be bound by the ultimate deci-
sion.28  If the preliminary decision favors the class defendant and also
results in a successful motion for summary judgment, 29 the potential
tions generally see Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action
Device and Its Utilization, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 631, 639 (1970). See also Frankel,
supra note 8, at 44-47.
22. Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971); Philadelphia v.
Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232, 234 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See also Kronenberg v. Hotel
Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (propriety of class action
must be determined solely on the basis of the requirements enumerated in Rule 23);
Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 7, at 104.
23. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60, 65, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
24. Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); accord, Weiss v. Tenney, 47 F.R.D. 283, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). A jury trial
is guaranteed by the seventh amendment "in suits at common law." See F. JAMES,
CIV. PROCEDURE 337 (1965).
25. Fogel v. Wolfgang, 47 F.R.D. 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Kronenberg v. Ho-
tel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Frankel, supra note 8, at
41. But see Green v. Wolf, 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968) where the court
held that the trial court could, if it determined individual reliance is an essential ele-
ment of proof, order separate trials on that subject as well as the subject of damages.
The issues of reliance or damages have not, however, been considered central to the
maintenance of a class action, see Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 488 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), remanded for further consideration, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.), decided, 53 F.R.D.
664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465,
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see, Ernst & Ernst v. United States Dist. Ct., 439 F.2d
1288, 1293 (5th Cir. 1971).
26. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 7, at 105-06.
27. Id.
28. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(3). The judgment would, of course, be subject to
collateral attack if representation was inadequate or due process was denied in any
other manner. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 7, at 106-07.
29. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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class members will probably not be bound by the decision 3 -- clearly
Rule 23 would not purport to bind them since there was no notice.3'
Consequently, a corporate defendant may have to defend other suits
based on the same facts, but it was partially in its interests that notice
was delayed.32 Moreover, the likelihood of other individual suits
is not great, and they probably can be eliminated without great ex-
pense or inconvenience to the corporate defendant.33
The approach in Alameda appears to be a desirable method of
handling the problems in a class action of questionable merit. The
court, however, should have sharply delimited the issues to be covered
at the hearing to avoid pre-trying the case, and also should have indi-
cated what the class representative must show to avoid a motion to
dismiss the class action, i.e., a substantial possibility of success. A strict
interpretation of Rule 23 or the policy against "one-way intervention"
should not be allowed to frustrate this or other innovative attempts to
effectively administer the complex machinery of a class action.
30. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Note, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action Device and Its Utilization, 22
U. FLA. L. REv. 631, 639 (1970).
31. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2) & (3). See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
32. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
33. See Note, Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(3)--The Notice Requirement, 29
MD. L. REv. 139, 155-56 (1969). The claims of individual members of a 23(b)(3)
class are likely to be negligible and can probably be settled out of court.
Rule 23 may permit another type of one-way intervention. In a jurisdiction which
has abandoned the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, a member of 23(b)(3) class who
has opted out may still be able to take advantage of a favorable judgment in the class
action while remaining unaffected by an adverse decision. Cohn, The New Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1225 n.88 (1966); Note, Proposed Rule
23, Class Action Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 652-54 (1965). For a view that the
policy against "one-way intervention" should give way to the policy against repetitious
litigation see Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. RaV.
609 (1971). Cf. Comment, The Requirement of Mutuality in Patent Cases, 1971
WASH U.L.Q. 658.
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